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Mr. Selander's Comment purports to refute my contention that an-
nual style change is an unlawful market weapon used by the Big
Three automobile manufacturers to achieve unprecedented structural
concentration and to erect insurmountable barriers to new entry.'
On its face, the Comment is both inconsistent and superficial in its
analysis of the rise of concentration in the industry. I argued in my
earlier Note that the Big Three's use of annual style change was
largely responsible for the elimination of nearly one hundred smaller
automobile producers, the erection of insuperable barriers to new-
comers, and the transformation of automobile manufacturing into a
tight oligopoly.2 In attempted rebuttal, Mr. Selander produces a
laundry list of factors other than annual restyling which he conjec-
tures may have contributed to the decline of competition in this in-
dustry: the Depression,3 a change in consumer demand from initial
to replacement, 4 the substitution of closed for open bodies,3 the in-
ception of installment purchasing." Although these developments may
well have hastened the trend towards concentration, only the De-
pression is arguably a causal element. Yet I examined and discounted
that possibility in a passage which Mr. Selander either failed to read
or chose to ignore. I cited Lanzillotti for the effect of the Depression
on the early auto firms: "The attrition during the depressed thirties
was only slightly greater than in the booming twenties." The De-
pression, therefore, could not explain the massive exit of producers
from the industry during the four decade period 1923-1963.8
A closer reading reveals that Mr. Selander actually concedes, albeit
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reluctantly, the concentration-increasing impact of annual style change
on the automobile industry. I suggested in my piece that style change
raised the capital costs of entry and survival in this industry con-
siderably more than tenfold.0 In addition to prohibitively expensive
yearly retooling, it required three other costly activities which small
volume producers could ill-afford to undertake: in-house production
at a 250,000 annual unit output of specialized body and engine com-
ponents, extensive advertising campaigns to accompany new model
introduction, and a nationwide network of franchised dealers with
specialized maintenance capabilities. To enter and survive in the
automobile industry in the 1970's, a firm would need at least $780
million. By contrast, had the industry not been restructured by an-
nual restyling, entry would cost about $55 million, or less than one-
tenth as much.10
Mr. Selander admits that annual restyling increased each of these
four entry/survival costs. He accepts my conclusion that yearly re-
tooling seriously disadvantages small volume producers by forcing
them prematurely to scrap expensive tools, dies and jigs: "The Note
correctly observes that other things being equal the premature scrap-
ping will increase the average costs of any firm producing a volume
of less than 250,000 cars a year."" And he concedes that style change
required enormous investments in components production: "Annual
style change . . .[was] one factor leading an automobile firm to rec-
ognize the efficiencies attained by the vertical integration of com-
ponents production."' 2 Mr. Selander also admits that "product dif-
ferentiation" (i.e., annual restyling) necessitated a nationwide network
of dealers with specialized maintenance capabilities.'2 Although, as
he points out, Big Three dealers finance their own operations, 14 a
new entrant lacking an assured sales volume would be forced to as-
sume the costs of financing a national distribution system., In addi-
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tion, by choosing to dispute the amount rather than the existence of
style change-generated advertising, Mr. Selander implicitly acknowl-
edges this cost factor as well.10 In short, with only minor qualifications,
his rebuttal affirms the concentration-increasing impact of annual
style change on the automobile industry.
What then is really at issue? Apparently, it is not the causal rela-
tionship of annual restyling to industry concentration. Instead, the
latent yet fundamental issue is whether a highly concentrated auto-
mobile industry serves consumers better than one which is com-
petitively structured. In my Note I argued that this industry's strik-
ingly anticompetitive structure (three firms account for ninety-seven
percent of domestic production)17 resulted in anticompetitive con-
duct (e.g., price fixing18 and product collusion1") and unsatisfactory
market performance (e.g., inflated selling costs, product imitation, high-
er-than-competitive-prices, collusive suppression of technological in-
novation, and persistently high rates of return2 0). To restore competi-
tion, I suggested that divesting GM, Ford and Chrysler of all but one
of their respective assembly facilities would provide plants well in
excess of the efficiency threshold (60,000 non-restyled cars per year)
for as many as forty-two new producers.2 ' Spin-off of the Big Three's
parts and distribution facilities, moreover, would enable new competi-
tors to assemble automobiles with improved performance capabilities
from components supplied by a variety of independent parts manu-
facturers and sold through independent distributors.
22
Mr. Selander promotes a radically different view-one apparently
supported by General Motors,2 3 whose dominance of the automobile
industry is widely-acknowledged. For example, he rejects any attempt
to restore competition by restructuring the industry because the Big
Three "will incur costs in learning how to cope with the new busi-
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ness environment. '24 In truth, GM would quite understandably fear
that a "new business environment" based on competitive free enter-
prise would force a reduction in car prices and deprive it of the mo-
nopoly profits which it currently shares with Ford and Chrysler. Mr.
Selander concludes with a warning which must warm the hearts of
General Motors executives: a competitively structured industry "would
provide less desirable transportation to consumers.
' '25
This is not an incredible position for General Motors; but it is for
a law student presumably familiar with the policy of competition
underlying our federal antitrust laws. On the other hand, Mr. Selan-
der's failure to refer to a single antitrust case or relevant statute sug-
gests a basic unfamiliarity with either precedent or policy. A brief
passage from Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Supreme Court in
Northern Pacific Rwy., a leading antitrust decision, may be instruc-
tive:
The unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices,
the highest quality and the greatest material progress .... 20
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